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WOMEN'S POWERLESS TOOL: HOW
CONGRESS OVERREACHED THE
CONSTITUTION WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REMEDY OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT
LISA A. CARROLL*

INTRODUCTION

In the time it takes to read this sentence, a man has beaten
his wife or girlfriend somewhere in the United States.1 In the time
it takes to read this introduction, another woman has endured a
forcible rape.' The horror, however, the battered woman or the
rape victim undergoes has only just begun.3 If they become among
4
the few who report such violence to law enforcement officials,
their ordeal will continue. Police officers and prosecutors will
subject these female victims to intense personal questioning.' A
* J.D. Candidate, 1998.
1. See Domestic Violence, Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before the
House Judiciary Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 103d Cong. 1 (1994)
(testimony of Vicki Coffey, Executive Director, Chicago Abused Women Coalition) [hereinafter Hearing on Domestic Violence) (asserting that a woman in
the United States is battered every 13 seconds); see also S. REP. No. 101-545,
at 27 (1990) (citing National Coalition Against Domestic Violence fact sheets
which state that a woman is beaten every 15 seconds).
2. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 7 (1988) (indexing the frequency of forcible rapes over a one year period). Of course, crimes do not occur one at a time with precise regularity. Id. If the 1988 number of forcible
rapes had occurred one at a time over a fixed time interval, however, perpetrators would have forcibly raped a woman every six minutes in the United
States during that year. Id.

3. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39 (1991) (contending that female complainants in rape and domestic violence cases are victimized twice: once by
the perpetrator and once by the state criminal justice system).
4. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 25-26 (1993) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 8
(1991)). The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that only 50% of all rapes
were reported in 1990. Id.
5. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-197, at 34 (quoting a Vermont probation officer who told a nine-year-old girl that he had heard she was a "tramp" and a
Connecticut prosecutor who accused a 15-year-old of fabricating a rape charge
because the girl feared being pregnant).
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judge may impugn the character of these women by suggesting
that they asked for it.' A jury will scrutinize their every gesture
and inflection to gauge their credibility

During nearly four years of hearings, Congress heard dra-

matic testimonials to such scenarios. 8 Congress also compiled disturbing statistics indicating that "violence motivated by gender"' is
on the rise despite state action to curb it.' 0 In response, Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"),"
which President Clinton signed into law on September 13, 1994, as
part of the much larger Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.12
The VAWA provides, inter alia, funding to the states "to combat violent crimes against women,"" creates a national domestic
violence hotline, 4 modifies the Federal Rules of Evidence in sexual

6. See, e.g., id. (quoting a California judge who said in open court that a
domestic violence victim probably deserved to be battered).
7. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-545, at 34 (1990) (suggesting that jurors
choose may not to convict an alleged rapist if they disapprove of what the victim wore when assaulted).
8. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 39 (1993).
9. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)
[hereinafter VAWA]. VAWA defines "violence motivated by gender" as "a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and
due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." Id. §
13981(d)(1).
10. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 38. Even before Senator Joseph Biden introduced VAWA in 1990, many states had enacted legal reforms to combat gender-based violence. Id. at 33. For example, most states stiffened their rules
for admitting evidence of the victim's prior behavior so that defense attorneys
cannot easily use such evidence to divert focus from the defendant's conduct.
Id. Moreover, many large cities have created sex and domestic crime units as
well as victim assistance programs. Id. Despite these efforts, the Senate Judiciary Committee found in 1993 that city and state police officers, state
prosecutors, and state courts often still handled crimes against women differently and less seriously than other crimes. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49.
11. VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
12. Id. VAWA is Subchapter III of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C, 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and
46 U.S.C.).
13. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3711-3797 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg (1994). For example, any
state, municipality, or local government which funds forensic medical exams
in sexual assault cases and filing and service fees for domestic violence cases
may apply for grants to supplement prosecution, law enforcement, and victim
service programs. Id. §§ 3796gg-3796gg-1.
14. The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1040110416 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 10416 (1994). A non-profit organization
actually runs the national hotline. Id. § 10416. Provided the organization
meets several requirements, such as personnel training, the federal govern-
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assault cases, 5 and makes traveling across state lines to commit
domestic violence a federal offense." Moreover, Subtitle C of the
VAWA 7 establishes a civil rights cause of action against any
"person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender .... .' This Comment focuses on the constitutionality of this
civil rights provision.' 9
Under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, a rape or domestic
violence victim2 may recover from her assailant compensatory and
punitive damages in addition to attorneys fees in a private civil
action." Although a rape or domestic violence victim must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that gender partially motivated her assailant,' she may bring such a suit whether or not her
assailant dragged her across state lines' and whether or not her
assailant acted in a solely private capacity.' The rape or domestic
violence victim need not prove the existence of interstate activity
or state action because to require her to do so would render the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy useless to all but a handful of vic-

ment will fund that organization for up to five years. Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994). Subtitle A of VAWA modified rule 412 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit, barring a few discrete exceptions, the
admission of evidence offered to prove the victim's sexual history or sexual
predisposition. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 412.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 110A (1994). The VAWA also extends full faith and credit
to state-issued protection orders. Id.
17. Subtitle C of the VAWA is entitled "Civil Rights Remedies for GenderMotivated Violence" [hereinafter the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy]. Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
18. Id. § 13981(c). The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy does not include
"random acts of violence unrelated to gender." Id. § 13981(e)(1).
19. Many sections of VAWA deserve analysis. For example, the provisions
creating new federal crimes, such as interstate domestic violence, have raised
issues of federalization. See, e.g., Michelle W. Easterling, Note, For Better or
Worse: The Federalizationof Domestic Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 933, 937
(1996) (arguing that Congress's efforts to combat violence against women
should focus on financial assistance to the states, not creating another federal
criminal offense). These issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
20. Technically, any person victimized by a crime motivated by gender, as
defined by VAWA, may utilize the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. 42 U.S.C. §
13981(b). However, in creating this cause of action, Congress focused on rape
and domestic violence against women. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993); S.
REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33 (1991); S. REP. No.
101-545, at 28 (1990). Accordingly, this Comment will also refer primarily to
victims of these crimes.
21. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
22. Id. § 13981(e)(1).
23. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779, 792 (W.D. Va. 1996) (noting the absence of a jurisdictional limitation in
the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy requiring involvement of interstate activity).
24. See id. at 797 (observing that one of Congress's purposes in enacting
the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy was to redress private acts of gendermotivated violence notwithstanding a lack of state action).
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tims."5 Congress intended the VAWA to sweep much more
broadly.26
Consequently, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy does not require any proof of interstate activity, nor any state action. 7 Yet,
by attempting to make the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy available
to more victims, Congress has actually rendered this remedy unavailable to all victims.28 Neither the Commerce Clause2" nor the
Fourteenth Amendment,0 the clauses upon which Congress predicated the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy,2 ' empowers Congress to
reach purely private conduct that does not substantially affect interstate commerce. 2
Two defendants recently raised this issue in actions brought
under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. In these two separate
cases, each defendant moved to dismiss the VAWA claim, arguing
that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to create a civil remedy for victims of
domestic violence or rape against their assailants. 3 Their consti25. See Easterling, supra note 19, at 949 (characterizing the VAWA Interstate Domestic Violence provision as "a small Band-Aid on a massive wound"
because only a few incidents of domestic violence occur in more than one state
and consequently become prosecutable under that provision); see also
Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 797 (averring that due to state criminal laws prohibiting violence against women, a VAWA plaintiff cannot prove that a state
caused or fostered the violent act against her).
26. See, e.g., Hearingon Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of
Charles Schumer, Representative, 10th Cong. Dist., N.Y.) (declaring that the
purpose of the hearing was to help all of the four million women each year
who are victimized by domestic violence).
27. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994)
(requiring only proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged act
of violence was motivated by gender).
28. See infra Part II for a discussion of the unconstitutionality of the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause states that "[tihe
Congress shall have power.., to regulate commerce... among the several
states..." Id. (emphasis added).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment states that "No
State shall ...abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. § 1 (emphasis added). The Fourteenth Amendment
empowers Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, [these] provisions
....
"Id. §5.

31. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a).
32. See infra Part II for a discussion regarding the constitutional implications of Congress attempting to reach purely private conduct which does not
substantially affect interstate commerce.
33. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
783 (W.D. Va. 1996); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996). In
Brzonkala, a female college student brought a VAWA Civil Rights claim
against two fellow students who, she reported, had sexually assaulted her in a
dormitory room. 935 F. Supp. at 781-82. In Doe, a battered wife sought
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tutional challenges, however, have resulted in antithetical opinions.'
On June 19, 1996, the District Court of Connecticut in Doe v.
Doe handed down an opinion in which the court asserted that violence against women poses a serious problem to society,' despite
current state and federal criminal and tort laws to prevent this
violence."' From this apparent truism, the Doe Court concluded
that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy must be constitutional under
the Commerce Clause37 and never even analyzed its constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
One month later, another federal district court, the Western
District Court of Virginia, repudiated the Doe Court's reasoning.'
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, the
court analyzed the issue from the legal premise that the Constitution limits Congress's authority.' Accordingly, it painstakingly
searched every vestige of power Congress enjoys under both the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.1
The
Brzonkala Court found that no interpretation of either provision
supported the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy and reluctantly resolved that the remedy was unconstitutional. 2
"damages for deprivation of her federal right to be free from her husband's
alleged gender-based violence against her." 929 F. Supp. at 610.
34. Compare Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801 (holding that Congress misconstrued its power to enact the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy under either the
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment), with Doe, 929 F. Supp. at
617 (holding that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to deter
gender-motivated crimes and that a civil cause of action is a proper means to
that end).
35. 929 F. Supp. at 610. Before addressing what authority Congress purported to exercise in enacting the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, the Doe Court
listed the most startling statistics compiled by the House and Senate. Id. at
611-12. Specifically, the Doe Court highlighted the tens of thousands of domestic crimes and rapes committed over a year and the millions of wives reportedly battered by their husbands each year. Id. at 611.
36. Id. at 616.
37. See infra notes 172 and 185 for a discussion of the analysis the Doe
Court employed to reach this conclusion.
38. 929 F. Supp. at 617. Specifically, the Doe Court inferred that "[gliven
the important nature of the conduct sought to be prevented.., this court
concludes that the statutory scheme which creates a federal civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence is ... permitted by the Constitution." Id.
39. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 791 (finding untenable the manner in which
the Doe opinion circumvented the United States Supreme Court's recent reinterpretation of the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995)). See infra Part II for a description of the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis in Lopez.

40. 935 F. Supp. at 785-86.
4L Id. at 785-801. See infra Part II for a discussion of the Brzonkala
Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy.
42. 935 F. Supp. at 801. The Western Virginia District Court agreed that
violence against women poses a serious threat in America and requires attention. Id. Nevertheless, the court cautioned that "Congress is not invested
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Thus, despite two district court opinions, the question
whether Congress possesses the necessary constitutional authority
under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment
to have enacted the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy remains unresolved. This Comment demonstrates that the final answer to this
question must be a resounding "no", despite Congress' apparently
noble intentions. As Part I of this Comment demonstrates, the
threat of gender-motivated violence is a real one to which the
states have not responded effectively and to which Congress sincerely felt compelled to respond. Part II illustrates that the
Brzonhala Court, and not the Doe Court, has correctly decided the
constitutionality of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. Finally, Part
III proposes repealing or striking the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
provision, but fortifying the remaining provisions of the VAWA
which comply with the Constitution and provide the much needed
assistance
to the states' individual wars on violence against
43
women.
I.

A PERVASIVE PROBLEM IN NEED OF EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS: THE
IMPETUS FOR THE VAWA

When Senator Joseph Biden introduced the VAWA in the
Senate on June 19, 1990, he spoke of a "national outrage" and implored his fellow congresspersons to take "swift" action." Four
years, several House and Senate hearings, and numerous committee reports later, 5 the VAWA finally became federal law. The legwith the authority to cure all of the ills of mankind." Id.
43. The Brzonkala Court suggested that a revised version of the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy could pass constitutional muster under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. Although the court did not specify how it would rewrite the
provision, it discussed the legitimacy of Congress's purpose in remedying the
denial of equal protection that rape and domestic violence victims reportedly
experience in state criminal justice systems. Id. at 800. The Brzonkala Court
thus implied that Congress should create a federal civil cause of action
against the state criminal justice system directly. However, such a provision
could raise Eleventh Amendment issues regarding state immunity. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XI (stating that "the Judicial power of the United States [does
not] extend" to suits against a state by a non-resident of that state). Such issues are beyond the scope of this Comment and therefore, this Comment does
not address possible amendments to the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy.
At least one constitutional scholar, Professor Burt Neuborne, has suggested that Congress has authority to enact the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
as written under either the Thirteenth Amendment or the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on
S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 99-102 (1991)
(statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University School
of Law) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 15]. As Congress did not predicate the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy on either of these constitutional provisions, this
argument is also beyond the scope of this Comment.
44. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 27-28 (1990).
45. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 39 (1993) (cataloguing the several hearings re-
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islative history compiled over those four years provides statistical
and testimonial support for Senator Biden's assertion that genderbased violence is a serious problem in need of solutions."
The following Section reveals how pervasive this problem has
become. Section B demonstrates that the states have contributed
as much to the problem as to the solution. The final Section of this
Part examines Congress's response as exemplified by the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy.
A. The Prevalenceof Violence PerpetratedAgainst Women
As the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized in 1993, violence affects men and children, as well as women. 7 However, the
likelihood that a crime will be perpetrated against a woman exceeds the same likelihood for men or children once rape and domestic violence statistics are included." According to the U.S.
Surgeon General, the probability that a woman age fifteen to fortyfour will suffer a violent injury due to a crime exceeds the probability that she will crash her car, get mugged, or die of cancer
combined."9 In fact, seventy-five percent of all women will experience some type of criminal violence within their lifetime. 50
When the Senate first studied violence against women in
1990, the statistics it gathered primarily involved crimes perpetrated by strangers. 1 During that study, the Senate Judiciary
garding VAWA held between 1990 and 1993).
46. See generally id. (drawing upon statistics and testimony gathered over
the four years during which the Senate and the House considered the VAWA
to support recommending that the Senate pass VAWA as amended).
47. Id. at 37. The Senate Judiciary Committee admitted that violence affects all members of society today at alarming rates. Id. However, as Helen
Neuborne of the National Organization for Women [hereinafter NOW] told
the committee, women not only risk muggings, burglaries, and all the other
crimes that every citizen fears but also risk crimes like rape which primarily
affect women. Women and Violence, Part 1: Hearing on S. 2754 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 58 (1990) (statement of Helen

Neuborne, Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund)
[hereinafter Hearingon S. 2754 Pt. 1].
48. Hearing on S. 2754 Pt. 1, supra note 47, at 58 (statement of Helen

Neuborne); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37.
49. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (citing Surgeon General Antonio Novello,
From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Services, 267 J. AM. MED.

ASS'N 3132 (1992)). Violence causes the majority of injuries inflicted on
women ages 15 to 44. Id. Two to four million women a year suffer injuries
due to domestic violence alone. Women and Violence, Part2: Hearings on S.
2754 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 117 (1990)

(testimony of Dr. Angela Browne, Public Sector Division, Department of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts Medical School) [hereinafter Hearingson
S. 2754 Pt.2].
50. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 38 (citing U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO
THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 29 (2d ed. 1988)).
5L See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 29 (1990) (describing the hearings con-

ducted in the 1990 consideration of the VAWA). The Senate Judiciary Com-
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Committee calculated that the rape rate had risen "four times as
fast" as the total crime rate over a ten year period.' Moreover, the
committee estimated that the number of assaults against young
women had climbed fifty percent over the preceding fifteen years."
In subsequent considerations of the VAWA, the Senate Judiciary Committee focused on domestic violence as well as rape.'
For example, the Committee highlighted in its 1993 Report to the
Senate that four million women endure some sort of domestic violence every year.' In its 1991 Report, the Committee declared
that more women were beaten than there were wives in 1990.6
Furthermore, although the Committee estimated that only one in
every three domestic violence victims reports the incident, it found
that police in 1991 reportedly received at least 21,000 complaints
of domestic crimes per week. 7
Assuming, arguendo, that these statistics accurately represent the level of violence that women in America face daily, Senamittee held two hearings during the 1990 study. Id. The first included testimony from a prosecutor for the Manhattan District Attorney's Sex Crimes
Prosecution Unit. Hearing on S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 51-56 (written
testimony of Linda Fairstein, Assistant District Attorney, New York County).
The second hearing spotlighted the risk that acquaintance rape poses especially to young women. Hearingon S. 2754 Pt. 2, supra note 49, at 2 (opening
statement of Chairman Biden) (moving focus of hearings from stranger rape
to acquaintance rape at urging of a campus rape survivor).
52. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 30. The Senate Judiciary Committee calculated
this figure based upon statistics reported by the FBI. Id. at 30 n.6. The accuracy of this calculation may be questionable. The U.S. Department of Justice
reported in 1994 that the rape rate had actually declined in 1984 for white
victims and in 1989 for black victims and that the rate had remained steady
for both groups through 1992. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION INTHE UNITED STATES: 1973-92 TRENDS 1
(1994) [hereinafter JUST. REP.]. However, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
also acknowledged difficulty in detecting rape trends because many rapes go
unreported or unprosecuted. Id. Thus, these figures may be higher than reported by the Bureau.
53. S.REP. No. 101-545, at 31. The Senate Judiciary Committee arrived at
this estimate with numbers promulgated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in
1988 and 1974. Id. at 31 n.11. The Bureau of Justice Statistics' 1994 accounts
furthermore indicate that the total rate of violent crimes against women between 1973 and 1992 increased while the rate of violent crimes against men
during that same time period decreased. JUST. REP., supra note 52, at 10.
54. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 37 (1991) (urging condemnation of
domestic violence and date rape but omitting stranger rape or assault in its
plea for action).
55. S.REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) (citing to Hearings on S. 2754 Pt.2,
supra note 49, at 116-17 (testimony of Dr. Angela Browne)).
56. S.REP. NO. 102-197, at 36 (basing conclusion on figures from the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, the National Women Abuse Prevention Project, and the testimony of Dr. Angela Browne, Hearingson S. 2754
Pt. 2, supra note 49, at 117).
57. MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG.,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 4 (Comm. Print
1992).
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tor Biden's call to action is undoubtedly legitimate.' The question
becomes, though, whether the states, the federal government or
both should address the problem of violence against women. As
the following Section reveals, the states acting alone have not sufficiently combatted the problem to date.
B. The States'Ineffective Response

Congress found during its consideration of the VAWA that although states are authorized through their police powers to combat the problem of gender-based violence, they have not responded
as quickly or as effectively as required.' Moreover, testimony before House and Senate committees indicated that the state judicial
systems may have actually exacerbated the problem. 60 Armed with
what they perceived to be proof of indifferent law enforcement and
of prejudicial state court systems, the Senate and House committees concluded that the states had ineffectively responded to the
growing threat of violence against women."1
1.

Lack of Diligent Law Enforcement

Despite the staggering number of rapes and domestic assaults
against women, the House and Senate found that many police organizations have proven woefully inept at solving these crimes,
much less deterring them.62 For example, less than forty percent
of stranger rapists are apprehended." Even more alarming, a
1986 study of the District of Columbia Police Department showed
that of 19,000 domestic violence reports, less than forty-two resulted in arrests."
58. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 27 (1990) (stating that "the realization that
the numbers of victims are growing [makes] swift committee consideration
imperative.").
59. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 43 (asserting that the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy is required because "state remedies are inadequate in practice
and in theory").
60. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 31 (written testimony of Marla Hanson, an assault victim) (asserting that "[t]he psychological
violence [Hanson] endured throughout the trial of [her] attackers was far
more traumatizing... than the attack on the street.").
61. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 48 (1991).
62. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-545, at 38 (indicting the state legislatures and
Congress for ignoring reports that "[airrest can stop abuse" but that only one
percent of domestic violence incidents result in arrest).
63. MAJORITY STAFF

OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

103D CONG.,

THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE 30 (1993).
Moreover, of those rapists apprehended, less than half are convicted of rape,
id. at 35, and of those convicted, most are incarcerated for only a year or less.
Id. at 2.
64. Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 98 (1992)
(testimony of Sandra Sands, Office of General Counsel, Department of Health
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However, as the Minneapolis Police Department and the National Police Foundation discovered in 1984, police can make a difference, especially in domestic violence cases." These organizations found that where police responded to a domestic violence
complaint and only gave the batterer a warning, the violence recurred thirty-seven percent of the time within six months.6 By
contrast, where police arrested the batterer, another incident occurred in only nineteen percent of the cases within six months.6,
Based on these statistics, several jurisdictions have implemented mandatory arrest policies in incidents of domestic violence." It may seem odd that a police officer must be forced to
make an arrest. These jurisdictions, however, have found that
mandatory arrest policies are the best way to counter the attitudes
shared by many law enforcement officers that domestic violence is
"just a quarrel," not a real crime.6' Unfortunately, this prejudice is
deeply rooted in our judicial system as well.
2

PrejudicialCourt Systems

A common law rule, often repeated during Congress's consideration of the VAWA, reveals the large hurdle facing rape and especially domestic violence victims who seek redress in our state
court systems. As Blackstone reported it, a husband could
"restrain" his wife provided he did not use "a stick thicker than a
man's thumb."" The U.S. Supreme Court relied on this misogynous rule as late as 1868 in disavowing a wife's claim of assault
and battery against her husband. 7 Furthermore, some states do
and Human Services, D.C. and Past President, D.C. Coalition Against Do-

mestic Violence). Of course, it is possible and perhaps highly likely that the
approximately 18,960 reports of domestic violence which did not result in an
arrest did not because the victim withdrew the complaint. Even if an explanation other than police apathy is proffered, however, one suspects that proponents of the VAWA would argue that the complaints were withdrawn because the victim lacked faith that the criminal justice system could
adequately protect her from further victimization. See, e.g., Hearing on S.
2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 33 (written testimony of Marla Hanson) (alleging
that the courts have inhibited victims from coming forward by allowing victims to be treated as the guilty party at trial).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (reporting from Sherman & Berk, The
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, in POLICE FOUNDATION REPORTS
(1984) that recidivism directly correlates with police action or inaction in domestic violence cases). The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment resulted from a joint study conducted by the Minneapolis Police Department
and the National Police Foundation. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing L. Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Power:A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. REV. 59 (1982)).
69. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 36 (1990).
70. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 36.
71. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910). The Thompson
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not recognize spousal rape as a crime to this day.
In those states that do acknowledge the criminality of rape
and domestic violence, some still do not consider these acts to be73
serious crimes or those affected by them to be innocent victims.
Prosecutors in Maryland, for instance, purposely let domestic violence and rape complaints fall by the wayside. 7 In cases that did
reach the Maryland courts, the victims then encountered judges
who treated their suffering as "trivial or unimportant."75
Other state studies have yielded similar results. A special
judicial committee in Georgia that studied the attitudes of police,
prosecutors, and judges discovered that gender-bias against female
complainants still pervades its system.76 A California Judicial
Advisory Committee warned that domestic violence victims did not
receive equal protection of the laws in that state's courts.7 7
In Connecticut, similar results as those found in other states
prompted a commission to make a cruelly ironic observation.7 ' The
commission report stated that "victim[s] of sexual assault suffer
not only because of the crime, but frequently suffer psychological
trauma from what they experience within the justice system."79
Thus, the phrase "insult to injury" takes on significant meaning for
rape and domestic violence victims relying on the courts for legal

Court held that a landmark statute permitting a wife to bring a civil action in
her own name did not also permit a wife to bring an action against her own
husband. Id. To permit a wife to sue her husband would have constituted a
"radical change[ ]" in the law that the Thompson Court presumed the legislature did not intend absent express language indicating such. Id.
72. Hearing on S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 64 (written statement of
Helen Neuborne). In 1990, when Ms. Neuborne testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, she explained that a majority of states at that time had
not yet repealed their spousal immunity laws that prohibited the prosecution
of a husband for raping his wife unless they were divorced or legally separated. Id. Furthermore, she averred that many states had similar prohibitions on acquaintance rape prosecutions where the victim lived with or dated
the rapist. Id.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27-28 (1993) (citing the reports discussed
infra notes 74-79).
74. MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE, GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 18
(1991) [hereinafter MD. REP.].
75. Id. at 27.
76. Id. at 28 (citing SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, GENDER AND JUSTICE IN
THE COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION

ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 34, 93 (1991) [hereinafter

GA. REP.]).

77. Id. at 27 (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS OF CALL
FORNIA, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN & MEN IN THE COURTS:
REPORT JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS 2 (1991) [hereinafter CAL. REP.]).

78. See id. (citing CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS,
GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE COURTS 17 (1991) [hereinafter CONN.
REP.](reporting on the psychological toll exacted on rape complainants by the

criminal justice system)).
79. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 27 (1993) (citing CONN. REP.).
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redress.
After several witnesses before Congress described this compounding of psychological injury upon psychological injury, 0 Congress gave the phenomenon a name: "double victimization."'
These witnesses also relayed to the House and Senate how "double
victimization" feels.8" Marla Hanson told the Senate, "it never occurred to me to blame myself for my own attack; that is, until the
courts, the press and society began to insinuate... [that] I [was]
the architect of my own suffering."83 A rape victim, in a letter to
the Senate Judiciary Committee, admonished that "if the system
continues to badger and blame women for the crimes they experience, it will not be long before we say, 'what's the point?"'"
Hence, although violence affects every member of society,
women appear not only more vulnerable to it, but also less capable
to procure legal redress following it. From the responding policeofficer, to the Assistant District Attorney, and finally to the judge
and jury, female rape and domestic violence complainants fight an
uphill battle for justice. Several states have actively pursued effective reformation of their criminal justice systems to eliminate
this unfair situation.85 The voluminous state-commissioned studies, to which the House and Senate cite in the legislative history of
the VAWA, attest to the seriousness of the states' resolve to effectively combat the problem of gender-bias in their legal systems.88
Nevertheless, Congress felt compelled to offer a significant legal
reform of its own.87
80. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 15, supra note 43, at 65 (testimony of Roland

Burris, Attorney General, State of Illinois) (equating those men "who wear a
robe and are called upon to judge the beating" with those men "who do the
beating"); Hearingson S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 33 (written testimony of

Marla Hanson) (describing her feelings of violation by the system); Id. at 59

(statement of Helen Neuborne) (suggesting that even where state laws provide adequate redress, backward-thinking judges fail to properly implement
them).
81. S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 39 (1991).
82. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 33 (written testimony of Marla Hanson) ("I felt more violated by the court proceedings[] than
by the actual assault").
83. Id. at 27 (statement of Marla Hanson).
84. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 34 (1990).
85. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 15, supra note 43, at 67 (testimony of Roland
Burris) (reporting that Illinois's revised sex crime statutes resulted in increased conviction rates within six months).
86. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27, 28 (1993) (citing reports from
studies of gender bias in state criminal justice systems in Maryland, Georgia,
California and Connecticut).
87. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-197, at 48 (1991) (asserting superiority of federal court system and citing prejudices in state criminal court systems and
"antiquated [state procedural rules" to justify conclusion that "a (flederal, not
a [sitate, remedy for gender-biased crimes" would be more fair and equitable
to gender-motivated crime victims). The Senate Judiciary Committee did not
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C. Congress'sResponse with the VAWA
Congress's rationale for enacting the VAWA began with the
presumption that violence against women poses a national
threat." From this premise, Congress then concluded that only a
national showing of intolerance for gender-based violence could
eradicate this threat." Congress therefore resolved that federal
legislation constituted an appropriate step toward eliminating
gender-based violence."
In 1990, on a somewhat more definitive level, the Senate justified certain provisions of the VAWA with economic reasons."'
The Senate Judiciary Committee focused on the financial burden
that many states and cities experienced due to its rising arrest and
prosecution rates and its increasing numbers of shelter and counseling facilities." Thus, much of the VAWA concentrates on supplementing the states' efforts to combat violence against women.
Some sections of the VAWA provide monetary and educational assistance to the states." Other sections mandate Department of
Justice studies to augment the states' independent investigations."
However, the provision that Congress most scrutinized, the
Civil Rights Remedy,99 intentionally avoids augmenting the states'

identify which state procedural rules it found "antiquated." Id.
88. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993). Although this presumption may be
true, the legislative history of VAWA does not substantiate it except to report
national crime figures. For example, the citations to these reports do not describe the collection method employed to gather the statistical data. Nor do
they indicate whether the incidents reported occurred throughout the fifty
states or whether they occurred in concentrated states or regions.
89. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (promising that the "[VAWA] is designed to
remedy not only the violent effects of the problem, but the subtle prejudices
that lurk behind it"); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35 (1991) (declaring that "[this]
legislation is an important step... in the direction of developing what we
need the most - a national consensus that this society will not tolerate this
kind of violence...").
90. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35.
91. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 39 (1990). In fiscal year 1989, Congress allocated $8.5 million, "just over [one percent] of the cost of a single B-2 bomber,"
to assist the fight against domestic violence. Id. at 40. Under the 1990 version of VAWA, that amount would have multiplied to $125 million. Id.
92. Id. at 39 ("Progress has.., created a whole host of new problems").
For example, Chicago was forced to open a third court in order to accommodate the overwhelming increase in domestic violence cases. Id.
93. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13931 (1994)
(providing grants to make public transportation facilities safer).
94. See, e.g., VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 14012 (appropriating funds for studying
sexual assault on university campuses).
95. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 (recognizing that Congress' authority to
create a civil rights cause of action for gender-motivated violence elicited several concerns); see also S. REP. No. 102-197, at 35 (1991) (reporting that a
special hearing was held in 1991 to explore Congress' power to enact a civil
rights remedy).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[30:803

authority.9 Congress enacted the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy to
give victims another avenue of legal redress.Y Though, in doing so,
Congress purposefully chose as its means a vaguely-worded federal civil
action that eradicates the state's participation as a
9
party. 8
1.

The Purpose

Congress professed to enact the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
for two reasons. First, it intended to close "the gender gap" in civil
rights legislation by providing a remedy for gender-motivated violence in much the same way that existing federal and state legislation reportedly provides for racially-motivated violence." Second, Congress sought. to remedy the inadequacies of the state
courts that, according to numerous congressional witnesses, have
deprived many female victims of equal protection of the laws."° As
a catch-all, Congress also averred that gender-based violence
negatively impacts interstate commerce in order to claim power to
enact the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy under the Commerce
Clause.''
In 1993, when the Senate Judiciary Committee sent the
VAWA to the floor for passage, it reported that the Civil Rights
Remedy was intended to close the "gender gap" in civil rights legislation.' '° According to the Committee, the Fourteenth Amendment
had empowered Congress and encouraged the states to create civil
remedies against violent discrimination."° Nevertheless, by 1993
less than a dozen state laws and no federal laws specifically addressed gender-bias crime." °
Therefore, the Senate Judiciary
Committee characterized the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy as a long
overdue and constitutionally permissible extension of civil rights

96. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress's purpose in creating a federal civil rights action rather than relying on
existing state tort and criminal laws.
97. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42 (1990).
98. Id.
99. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48-49 (1993).
100. Id. at 49.
101. Id. at 54.
102. Id. at 48 (citing the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 as establishing a prohibition against discriminatory attacks based on race, religion, or national origin but noting that Congress has enacted no such legislation against genderbased attacks).
103. Id. at 55. "This country has been using [flederal civil rights laws to
fight discriminatory violence for 120 years. [The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy]
is a logical extension of this tradition." Id. at 51.
104. Id. at 48 (reporting that in the past 10 years, many states have created
civil causes of action for hate crimes, but few include gender-biased violence
and noting that the federal Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 does not require
collection of statistics regarding gender-biased crimes though it mandates
gathering information regarding other hate crimes).
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In 1990, the Senate Judiciary Committee explained its motivations more thoroughly. First, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
puts a "legal tool in victims' hands" that the victim alone manipulates without a state prosecutor's interference.'O' Second, according to the Senate Judiciary Committee, a defendant may not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil cause of action;
therefore, the victim may force the defendant to testify against
himself.0 7 Finally, "a [flederal remedy offers victims the best court
°
system in the world,"'O
and an opportunity to choose a favorable
jury rather than relying upon a prosecutor to do so." Thus, Con-

105. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993). In asserting Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment power to enact the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, the Senate Judiciary Committee averred that the Fourteenth Amendment "authorizes Congress to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the... [Almendment's guarantees of equal rights." Id. at 55. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
explicitly guarantee equal rights, however. The Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees "equal protection of the laws" by the state. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV § 1. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a woman has a right to receive
equal protection of the laws from the state but arguably does not have a right
not to be assaulted, raped, or even murdered by a private actor. See, e.g.,
JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.5 (5th ed.

1995) (stating that "there has not yet been a Supreme Court case holding that
Congress, by statute, may reach purely private actions" under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
But see JEROME BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 1311 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that Justice Brennan had

argued that two Supreme Court cases do establish Congress' power to reach
purely private action under the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, by addressing the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy to the private perpetrator committing the
violent act rather than to the state actors denying the victim equal protection
of the laws prohibiting that violent act, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy arguably is not appropriate Fourteenth Amendment legislation and, therefore,
Congress has impermissibly extended civil rights legislation. See infra Part II
for further discussion of the debate surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment
state action requirement.
106. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 42 (1990). "[This remedy is] important because
[it] allow[s] survivors an opportunity for legal vindication that the survivor,
not the [s]tate, controls." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (claiming that the federal court system is superior to those of the
states because federal judges are "insulated from local political pressures").
Helen Neuborne of NOW espoused this view in her testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Hearing on S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 59
(statement of Helen Neuborne). Ms. Neuborne asserted that because federal
judges are appointed for life, they therefore will discriminate less against female plaintiffs. Id. One might also argue that because federal judges are appointed for life and presumably therefore "insulated from local political pressure," they also do not feel pressured to be "politically correct" and thus are
actually more likely to continue to treat women with disrespect.
109. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 42 (hypothesizing that a victim will be more
adept at "screen[ing] out jurors who harbor irrational prejudices
against ... rape [and domestic violence] victims" than prosecutors who have
handled hundreds of such cases).
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gress' "remedy" to inadequacies in state criminal justice systems
consists of allowing female victims of gender-motivated violence to
bypass the state criminal justice systems altogether. Moreover,
the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy encourages the state criminal justice systems to cease denying rape and domestic violence victims
equal protection by requiring the perpetrator, not the state, to pay
the victim damages."0
Obviously anticipating a charge that Congress lacked power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to reach purely private conduct,
Congress, as an afterthought, also invoked its power under the
Commerce Clause."' Without citing to any authority or testimony,
the Senate Judiciary Committee surmised that violence against
women "restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities,
increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending.""'
The Committee inferred that gender-based violence affects the national economy which in turn affects interstate commerce. "1 Accordingly, the Senate Judiciary Committee surmised that with its
plenary power under the Commerce Clause, Congress may extend

individual, civil rights legislation to victims of rape and domestic
violence in order to eliminate the negative
impact such violence
4
purportedly has on interstate commerce.1
2. The Means
The VAWA Civil Rights provision does not address every rape
or every battering."' The provision encompasses only "crime[s] of
110. See infra Part II for an illustration of the lack of nexus between the
equal protection violation in the state criminal justice system that the VAWA
purports to remedy and the civil cause of action aimed at the individual rapist
or batterer.
111. S.REP. NO. 103-138, at 54 (1993). The Senate Judiciary Committee, in
fact, created a new test unarticulated by the Court: "The Commerce Clause is
a broad grant of power allowing Congress to reach conduct that has even the
slightest effect on interstate commerce . . ." Id.

But see United States v.

Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995) (stating unequivocally that Congress may
regulate only "the use of channels of interstate commerce," "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and "those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce").
112. S.REP. No. 103-138, at 54.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 54-55 (averring that the Supreme Court upheld the rationale that
fear of violence affects the national economy and therefore interstate commerce when it held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was constitutional but
failing to cite to any Supreme Court case so holding).
115. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994)
("Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under... this
section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender..."). The VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy "does not create a general [flederal law for all assaults or
rapes against women". S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993). In addition, this
provision does not confer supplemental, federal jurisdiction over divorce, child
custody, and other domestic relations claims. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4).
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violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus"' based on the victim's gender."" Moreover, only an act that the state or federal government
has defined as a felony posing a "serious risk of physical injury to
another" constitutes a "crime of violence" under the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy.1 8 Presumably to sidestep the spousal immunity
laws still in existence in some states," 9 the provision does not require a prior "criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction."20
The final version of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy limits the
cause of action much more than earlier drafts. In 1993, the Senate
amended the proposed language of the VAWA in anticipation of a
constitutional challenge."' Originally, the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy did not require proof that gender animus motivated, at
least in part, the violent act at issue.112 Moreover, early versions of
the provision presumed that gender inherently motivates rape and
sexual assault."' Under the enacted version, the plaintiff must
prove gender-motivation by a preponderance of the evidence, irre-

116. BLACK'S defines "animus" as "[m]ind; soul; intention; disposition; design; will; [or] that which informs the body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 57
(abr. 6th ed. 1991). Witnesses before Congress defined "animus" as a hostile
or malevolent intention. See, e.g., Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender:
Hearingon H.R. 1133 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 101 (1993) (prepared state-

ment of James Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1133] (quoting Webster's dictionary as defining "animus" as "prejudiced and often spiteful").
117. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1).
118. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A).
119. Hearing on S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 64 (written statement of

Helen Neuborne).
120. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(2).
121. See Hearing on H.R. 1133, supra note 116, at 2 (statement of Sally

Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund)
(contrasting differences between the House version of the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy which required proof only of a "crime of violence motivated by gender" and the Senate amended version which requires a showing that "the
crime was due, at least in part, to an animus based on gender); see also S.
REP. No. 103-138, at 50 (1993) (listing limitations added to the Senate version
to narrow the remedy's scope to exclude random acts of violence). As Ms.
Goldfarb reported to the House of Representatives, the Senate narrowed its
version of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy in response to advise from federal
judges, civil liberties groups, and others. Hearing on H.R. 1133, supra note
116, at 3 (statement of Sally Goldfarb); See also id. at 82 (statement of the
Honorable Vincent McKusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices)
(reporting that the Conference of Chief Justices recommended the elimination
of the Civil Rights Remedy in the VAWA). The Senate itself conceded that the
constitutionality and wisdom of the Civil Rights Remedy had caused debate.
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48.
122. Hearing on H.R. 1133, supra note 116, at 2 (statement of Sally Goldfarb).
123. Id.
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spective of the type of violent act at issue. 2'
Despite these limiting amendments, some have forewarned
that the standard remains ambiguous and unworkable. 1 5 For example, an American Civil Liberties Union representative counseled the House of Representatives that the standard as modified
does not clearly indicate whether "animus," as used in the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy, requires the defendant to have acted purposefully or with hostility. 2' Congress responded to this criticism
by declaring that "animus" as used in the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy is synonymous with "motivated by," "because of," "on the
basis of," or "based on" as the courts have defined these phrases in
Title VII and other civil rights litigation. 17 Nevertheless, even the
proponents of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy concede that the
"animus" element of this provision will require further "fleshing
out" by the courts.' 2' However, as the following Part will demonstrate, this "fleshing out" will prove unnecessary because the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy cannot pass constitutional muster.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VAWA CIL RIGHTS
REMEDY
Although our constitutional jurisprudence has struggled to

124. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994). Although the act at issue in a
cause of action arising under this provision necessarily constitutes a felony
under state and/or federal law, the plaintiff need not prove her claim beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(A)-§ 13981(e)(1). The Senate Judiciary
Committee supported the lower standard by referring to other, uncited, civil
rights cases tried under the rules and standards of civil law. S. REP. No. 103138, at 53. Moreover, the lower standard was an essential ingredient to the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy's fulfillment of Congress's purpose in enacting it.
See Hearing on S. 2754 Pt.1, supra note 47, at 59 (statement of Helen Neuborne). By requiring a lower burden of proof, the provision removes one of the
obstacles preventing victims of violence against women from prevailing in
court. Id. Removing such obstacles greatly motivated many proponents of the
provision to fight for its passage. See id.
125. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1133, supra note 116, at 20 (prepared statement of Elizabeth Symonds, legislative counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (averring that even if "gender animus" is sufficiently defined by Congress,
such a standard does not define the prerequisite motive or intent that the defendant must be proved to have had).
126. Id. (prepared statement of Elizabeth Symonds). See supra note 116 for
an illustration of the diverging definitions given "animus".
127. S.REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53 (1993). But see Hearing on H.R. 1133,
supra note 116, at 21 (prepared statement of Elizabeth Symonds)
(illuminating the impracticability of applying Title VII definitions to cases of
domestic violence by asking Congress, inter alia, "If a husband becomes furious with his wife because she crashed his car, and he proceeds to beat her, are
his actions committed because of gender and due to animus based on her gender?").
128. Hearing on H.R. 1133, supra note 116, at 102 (statement of James
Turner).
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balance the preservation of our federalist system as envisioned by
the framers12 with the adaptation of the Constitution to the exigencies of the times,8 0 one principle has remained constant: "[The
federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.""' Thus, any power that Congress has to enact legislation must be delegated to it by the Constitution.1 2 When Congress exceeds its constitutionally delegated power, the courts must
"
intercede "to say what the law is.
"
Congress predicated the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy on its
powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment."' The Doe court found that Congress did have the prerequisite power for this enactment under the Commerce Clause."35
However, the Brzonkala court found that Congress did not have
power to enact the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy under either the
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 This Part
analyzes the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
and concludes that neither provision empowers Congress to enact
the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy.
A. Lack of Authority Under the Commerce Clause
Article I of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to enact
any
"necessary
and
proper " 137
law
"to
regulate
[clommerce ...among the several [s]tates.""8 In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden defined this commerce
power as a plenary one that Congress may exercise "to its utmost
129. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (avowing that "a
healthy balance of power between the [sitates and the [flederal government
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front").
130. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)
(counseling that "it is a constitution we are expounding").
131. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
132. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)
(forewarning that Congress' "powers... are defined and limited;
and[]... those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten.. ."); See also Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824) (explaining that "enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated...
133. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
134. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). See
supra Part II for a recitation of these constitutional provisions.
135. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp 608, 617 (D. Conn. 1996).
136. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
801 (W.D. Va. 1996).
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause states that "The Congress
shall have [p]ower... [t]o make all [1laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into [e]xecution the foregoing [plowers" Id. One of the
"foregoing powers" is the Commerce Clause contained in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
138. Id. cl. 3.
This clause states that "The Congress shall have
[plower... [t]o regulate [c]ommerce with foreign [niations, and among the
several [s]tates, and with the Indian [tiribes." Id.
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extent."" 9 Since Gibbons, however, Congress has pushed the
meaning of "necessary and proper" commerce regulation farther
and farther.4 ° With each push, Congress has enacted legislation
designed less to regulate the trading of goods or transporting of
people between the states... and more to mask the exercise of a
federal police power that the Constitution's framers intentionally
did not grant to Congress.' Moreover, with each push, Congress
met an accommodating Supreme Court that reinterpreted Commerce Clause jurisprudence as required to uphold the constitutionality of the statute at issue.' 4'
The Court's unquestioning deference to Congress' commerce
power has abruptly ended, however.'" In 1995, the Court struck
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 because the Court
found that Congress had surpassed its power under the Commerce
Clause.4 " United States v. Lopez marked the first time in nearly
sixty years that the Court recognized limits to Congress' plenary
commerce power. " As a result of Lopez, the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy no longer finds authority under the Commerce Clause. 47

139. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 196 ((1824).
140. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and The Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (1996) (editorializing the history of

Commerce Clause jurisprudence); See also Lino A. Graglia, United States v.
Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEx. L. REV. 719
(1996) (warning that an expanded Commerce Clause power threatens our system of federalism).
141. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 183 (6th ed. 1991) (defining "commerce"
as "the exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the buying,
selling, and exchanging of articles[;]. .. [t]he transportation of persons and
property by land, water, and air").
142. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54-55 (2d ed.
1979) (conceding that the federal government does not have a police power
over the states but asserting that where the regulated activity can be said to
fall within the scope of interstate commerce, Congress has power to regulate
it even though Congress' purpose is to effectuate social or moral policy); See
also Graglia, supra note 140, at 734-37 (noting that in several cases the Court
has upheld federal legislation ultimately aimed at activities within the sphere
of the states' police powers, like prostitution and food manufacturing, provided the legislation facially regulated commerce).
143. Epstein, supra note 140, at 169-74. Epstein gives a detailed history of
the Commerce Clause, editorializes the dramatic shifts which the Court perpetrated with hardly a notice, and ultimately concludes that, until recently,
"no subject worthy enough to attract Congress's[] attention failed to win the
Court's blessing under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 173. With the exception
of those discussed infra Part II.A.1,2, the individual tests that the Court
manufactured and doctored in order to facilitate Congress's infiltration into
the states' autonomy are beyond the scope of this Comment.
144. Epstein, supra note 140, at 168.
145. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
146. Graglia, supra note 140, at 720.
147. See infra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of how the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy fails to pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause.
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1. The "CumulativeEffects" Doctrine
Commerce power expansion reached an apex in 1942 with the
development of the "cumulative" or "aggregated effects" doctrine.'"
This doctrine incorporated earlier rules that required the regulated activity to substantially affect interstate commerce although
the regulated activity could do so indirectly.!4 9 Unlike those earlier
rules, however, the cumulative effects doctrine does not require
that each individual, minor, and solely interstate act substantially
affect interstate commerce; rather, it requires that the sum or agof several such acts substantially affects interstate
gregate effect
1
5
commerce.

The cumulative effects doctrine opened the floodgates for
Congress to enact social legislation under the Commerce Clause
that the Constitution did not otherwise authorize."' For example,
a public accommodation could no longer constitutionally discriminate against an African-American traveler, regardless of whether
the traveler resided in the state of the accommodation. 2 Similarly, a lunch counter could no longer constitutionally discriminate
due to race though the customer and counter were located in the
same state.ln Congress could not have reached such activity under
the Fourteenth Amendment because the discriminators were private, rather than state actors. 5' Under the cumulative effects doc148. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630 (referring to Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
787 (1996) (citing Lopez for the proposition that Wickard exemplifies the farthest stretch of commerce power); Epstein, supra note 140, at 172-73
(averring that Wickard established a limitless commerce power). Wickard in-

volved an attempt to penalize an individual wheat farmer under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 whose harvest exceeded the federally mandated
quota by 12 acres but who only wished to use the excess wheat himself. 317
U.S. at 114. Nevertheless, the Court held that the act was constitutional as
applied to the farmer because although his "own contribution to the demand
for wheat [was] trivial by itself... his contribution, taken together with that
of many others similarly situated, [was] far from trivial." Id. at 127-28. The
Court concluded that the cumulative effect of many farmers producing homegrown wheat in excess of their quotas would substantially affect interstate
commerce, and that, therefore, each individual farmer fell within the reach of
Congress's commerce power. Id. at 128.
149. Epstein, supra note 140, at 186.
150. Id.
151. See Hearings on S. 15, supra note 43, at 96 (statement of Burt Neuborne) (listing cases in which the Court upheld legislation targeted at private
racial discrimination and other social concerns under the Commerce Clause);
see also BARRON, supra note 105, at 106-07 (describing how the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 succeeded in reaching private conduct whereas the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 failed because Congress predicated its power to enact the 1964 Act
on the Commerce Clause in addition to the Fourteenth Amendment).
152. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964).
153. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964).

154. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 142, at 121 (emphasizing that by finding the
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trine, though, Congress could reach this activity through its Commerce Clause power by demonstrating that the aggregate of all or
many public accommodations and lunch counters discriminating
on the basis of race would substantially affect interstate commerce. 1
However, the Court partially closed the floodgates in Lopez by
refusing to extend the cumulative effects doctrine to the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990.1" The Act prohibited possession of a gun
in or near a school157 but did not require a case-by-case connection
between the defendant and interstate activity or between the gun
and interstate commerce.6 Moreover, the Act's legislative history
did not even attempt to establish that possession of a gun in or
near a school substantially affects interstate commerce. 159 Nevertheless, the government argued that the aggregate of gun-laden
schools did substantially affect interstate commerce." The Court
rejected this argument, however, and held that the cumulative efCivil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional under the Commerce Clause, the Court
in Heart of Atlanta avoided deciding whether the act could constitutionally
reach purely private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment). One presumes that the Doe Court extrapolated this reasoning when it too avoided any

Fourteenth Amendment analysis in finding the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
constitutional. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 617 (1996).
155. Heartof Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 253; McClung, 379 U.S. at 294.
156. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995) (ruling that
because the Gun-Free School Zones Act proscribes activity which facially "has
nothing to do with 'commerce,' the cumulative effects doctrine cannot support
the Act).
157. Id. at 1626. The Gun-Free School Zones Act specifically outlawed "any
individual to knowingly possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Id.
158. Id. at 1631. The Court refers to this case-by-case connection as a
"jurisdictional element." Id. The Court struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act in part because it did not expressly include such an element limiting its scope to only those "firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate comierce." Id.
159. Id. The Court cannot require Congress to make legislative findings.
Id. Moreover, even where Congress does record legislative findings in support
of an enactment under the Commerce Clause, the Court will independently
determine the sufficiency of those findings. Id. Nonetheless, the Court will
look to the legislative history to reveal a substantial effect "not visible to the
naked eye" before striking an enactment predicated on the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 1632. In Lopez, though, the Court found that Congress did not record
any finding of a nexus between gun possession in a school zone and interstate
commerce, if Congress made such a finding at all. Id. at 1631.
160. Id. at 1632. The government argued, in a "cost of crime" theory, that
the aggregate of guns in schools leads to violent crime which affects the national economy through increased insurance costs which trickle down to the
citizenry and through restricted movement which depresses those areas
deemed unsafe. Id. The government also argued, in a "national productivity"
theory, that the aggregate of guns in schools threatens the learning environment, which in turn produces an ignorant citizenry, which in turn reduces the
national productivity, which in turn substantially affects the national economy, which finally substantially affects interstate commerce. Id.
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fects doctrine did not apply where the regulated activity does not
61
"arise out of' or is not "connected with a commercial transaction."
In so holding, the Court strained not to overrule precedent," but
the Court in Lopez undeniably rolled back Commerce Clause jurisprudence."

16L Id. at 1631. Although the Court held in Lopez that the cumulative effects doctrine no longer applies to non-economic activity, or activity unrelated
to a commercial transaction, the Court responded to the government's argument. Id. at 1632. Specifically, the Court criticized the government's "cost of
crime" theory because under it Congress could regulate any form of violent
crime no matter "how tenuously [it] relate[d] to interstate commerce." Id.
Similarly, the Court disparaged the "national productivity" theory because it
would license Congress to invade spheres of state sovereignty, like "family
law," on a showing that the conduct at issue distracted a worker. Id. Congress asserted precisely these rationales in exercising its commerce power to
enact the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993)
(averring that gender-motivated violence "restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer
spending").
162. Epstein, supra note 140, at 169. Epstein noted that unlike Justice
Thomas, who in a concurring opinion expressly stated that he would revise all
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, struggled to "domesticate" the precedents rather than to "defy" them. Id.
Hence, the Court in Lopez distinguished Wickard, from which the cumulative
effects doctrine developed, as upholding a statute regulating an economic activity: the production and marketing of wheat. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995).
163. See Epstein, supra note 140, at 169 (criticizing Justice Rehnquist's attempt to reconcile Lopez with Commerce Clause precedent and calling the
opinion "change under the mantle of continuity"). Whether or not the Court
acknowledged its about-face regarding Commerce Clause jurisprudence in
Lopez, the Court most definitely drew a line in the sand. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1634 (stating that "[tlhe broad language in [previous commerce clause]
opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline
here to proceed any further"). Nevertheless, the lower courts have treated
Lopez disparately. Some, like the Brzonkala Court, have recognized that
Lopez eliminated the cumulative effects doctrine where the legislation at issue
is non-economic. See, e.g., United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 136364 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding child support statute unconstitutional under
Lopez); Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 807 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (holding
abortion clinic access statute unconstitutional under Lopez). Other lower
courts have limited Lopez to the Gun-Free School Zones Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding felonious possession
of firearm statute); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995)
(upholding abortion clinic access statute); and United States v. Leshuk, 65
F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding car-jacking statute).
Clearly, news of Lopez has reached the prison population. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reported that "[c]riminal defendants across the
country have exploited [the] uncertainty [following Lopez], citing [it] in hopes
that the statutes underlying their convictions will similarly be invalidated."
United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d. 1444, 1448 (6th Cir. 1996). Though one understands the lower courts' reluctance to venture into mass reversal of convictions, this Comment will proceed under the assumption that Lopez did discard
the cumulative effects doctrine where the legislation at issue is non-economic.
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2. Proving "SubstantialEffect" After Lopez

The Supreme Court did not eradicate the cumulative effects
doctrine but did narrow its applicability in Lopez.'" The doctrine
still applies where the legislation at issue regulates economic activity." However, where the regulated activity does not "arise out
of' or is not "connected with a commercial transaction"'" and
therefore is non-economic, Congress must evince a sufficient nexus
between the regulated activity at issue in each case and interstate
commerce." 7 This nexus exists where the legislation contains a
jurisdictional element.'" For example, the Gun-Free School Zones
Act in Lopez would have withstood constitutional scrutiny if it had
required the government to prove not only that the defendant
brought a gun to school but also that the defendant or the gun had
"recently moved in interstate commerce. " 1
Absent a jurisdictional element the Court will not uphold
Commerce Clause legislation that regulates non-economic activity
unless the statute's legislative history demonstrates that the activity nevertheless substantially affects interstate commerce. 7 ' After
Lopez, however, Congress will have difficulty convincing the Court
that any non-economic activity occurring exclusively intrastate
In rejecting the govsubstantially affects interstate commerce.'

164. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
165. Id. at 1630. The Court also left two other categories of activity that
Congress may reach under the Commerce Clause undisturbed. Id. at 1630.
As developed through precedent, Congress may regulate activity pertaining to
the channels or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Id. Because
the Court summarily concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not
address either the channels or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
the Court did not review these categories of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
in Lopez. Id. Similarly, the Brzonkala Court quickly recognized that gendermotivated violence does not pertain to channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F.
Supp. 779, 786 (1996). Thus, as in Lopez, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
must regulate activity which substantially affects interstate commerce. Id.
166. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
167. Id. at 1626 (holding that Congress lacked authority to enact the GunFree School Zone Act of 1990 because the Act did not regulate economic activity nor include a jurisdictional element requiring a nexus between each gun
possession and interstate commerce).
168. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
169. Id. at 1634.
170. Id. at 1631-32.
171. The Court repeated in Lopez that "'simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does
not necessarily make it so." Id. at 1629 n.2 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). Moreover, the Court advised that the judiciary ultimately determines the degree of effect an activity may have on interstate commerce. Id.
(citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964)
(Black, J., concurring)).
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ernment's proffered "costs of crime" and "national productivity"
rationales, the Court in Lopez warned that it would no longer "pile
inference upon inference" to uphold legislation predicated on the
Commerce Clause but really aimed at usurping the states' police
power.'72
3.

The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy Under Lopez

The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy does not include a jurisdictional element which limits its scope to acts of gender-motivated
violence connected to interstate commerce.' A victim of gendermotivated violence need only prove that the defendant committed
a "crime of violence" 74 and that the defendant committed the crime
"due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."'
A VAWA Civil Rights Remedy plaintiff need not prove that the defendant "recently moved in interstate commerce." 7 6 Therefore, to
survive Lopez, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy must regulate economic activity or the provision's legislative history must evince
that gender-motivated 77violence substantially affects interstate
commerce nonetheless.

The fact that Congress purported to remedy gender-based
violence with the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is not dispositive of
172. Id. at 1632, 34. The Doe Court dismissed this warning as dictum. Doe
v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 613 (1996). The Doe court did not regard the Court's
advisement in Lopez as an indication of how the majority of the Court will
rule in a future review of such reasoning. Given the current posture of the
Court, this warning may not remain dictum for long. See, e.g., Epstein, supra
note 140, at 168 (reporting that before the Court granted certiorari in Lopez,
"at least four of the Justices were ... gunning for the ... Commerce Clause").

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recognized that
the court may hold the "costs of crime" and the "national productivity" rationales too tenuous to support regulation of purely local activity under the
Commerce Clause. United States v. Gluzman, 953 F.Supp. 84, 88-89 (S.D.
N.Y. 1997). After reciting the legislative history surrounding the VAWA interstate domestic violence provision that echoed these rationales, the Gluzman Court nevertheless held that the provision was constitutional because
the provision, unlike the Civil Rights Remedy, contains the element of crossing state lines. Id. at 89. Moreover, the Gluzman Court explicitly distinguished the Brzonkala and Doe opinions, as dealing with purely intrastate
activity. Id. at 89 n.3.
173. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994);
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 792
(1996).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994). The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy defines
"a crime of violence" as "an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony... present[ing] a serious risk of physical injury to another... com[ing]
within the meaning of State or Federal offenses" Id. § 13981(d)(2)(A).
175. Id. § 13981(d)(1).
176. Cf United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (striking the
Gun-Free School Zones Act in part for failing to require a similar jurisdictional element).
177. See supra Part II.A.2 for a recitation of Lopez.
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whether it regulates economic activity. The Court in Lopez demonstrated that two cases upholding Congress' power to reach racial
discrimination under the cumulative effects doctrine actually involved economic activity.17 First, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States concerned a public accommodation's refusal to engage in a business transaction with a patron.7 9 Second, Katzenbach v. McClung concerned a lunch counter's refusal to engage in a
business transaction with a patron.' ° Although Congress ultimately intended to proscribe racial discrimination with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, it regulated economic activity to effectuate that
end in both cases.'s'
There is, however, nothing remotely economic about rape or
domestic violence 2 Rape is the most personal of violations-the
invasion of one's body. Domestic violence, by definition, occurs
within a personal relationship. Yet the VAWA Civil Rights RemSuch acts do
edy targets acts like rape and domestic violence.'
not "arise out of' and are not "connected with a commercial transaction."'1 The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy therefore clearly does
and the cumulative effects doctrine
not regulate economic activity
85
consequently cannot save it.

Moreover, the congressional committees' few findings regarding the effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce
are unpersuasive. The Senate Judiciary Committee, which compiled the majority of the documentation in support of the VAWA,
made one unsupported declaration that gender-based violence indirectly impacts employment, health care, and retail sales, which
consequently impact the national economy, which consequently
impacts interstate commerce. 8 To conclude from this one unsubstantiated assertion that gender-motivated violence substantially
affects interstate commerce, the Court must "pile inference upon
18
inference." 187

The Court has stated it will no longer do this.

178. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
179. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 244 (1964).
180. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 297 (1964).
181. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
182. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779, 791 (1996) (distinguishing gender-motivated violence from economic activities like crop production and goods shipping).
183. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993);
S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33 (1991); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 27-28 (1990).
184. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
185. The Doe Court nevertheless concluded that the aggregate of violence
motivated by gender substantially affects interstate commerce. Doe v. Doe,
929 F. Supp. 608, 613 (1996). Following the Court's decision in Lopez, the
Brzonkala Court rejected the application of the cumulative effects doctrine to
non-economic activity. 935 F. Supp at 786.
186. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54.
187. Cf Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (refusing to accept a long chain of causation to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
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Thus, in light of the Supreme Court's recent, more limited reading
of Congress' commerce power, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
fails to pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause.
B. Lack of Authority Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment

Unlike the Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits slavery
and involuntary servitude and which draws no distinction between
private and governmental actors,18 the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically addresses state action "abridg[ing] the privileges or
immunities of [national citizenship]," "depriv[ing] any person
of... due process," or "deny[ing]... equal protection of the laws"
to any person." The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, though predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment,1 91 excludes any state action
requirement.'
It remedies the private act of gender-motivated
violence whether or not the defendant acted "under the color of
any statute," and does not remedy the state criminal justice system's denial of equal protection.9 3
Proponents of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy assert that the
Fourteenth Amendment nonetheless authorizes the provision. T9
They cite to cases such as United States v. Guest9 and Griffin v.

196 to support their contention that the Supreme Court
Breckenridge
has abandoned the state action requirement where Congress affirmatively legislates to prohibit conduct violative of Fourteenth

188. Id. at 1634.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

191. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994).
192. See Hearingon H.R. 1133, supra note 116, at 82 (testimony of the Honorable Vincent McKusick) (observing that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
"appears to eliminate, or at least to vitiate, the 'state action' requirement for
civil rights litigation...").
193. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (directing the cause of action toward "[a]
person []including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State"). Thus, the provision, though including those perpetrators acting "under color of state law," does not require
the defendant to have acted "under color of state law." Hearingon H.R. 1133,
supra note 116, at 82 (statement of the Honorable Vincent McKusick).
Moreover, the remedy does not address the state criminal justice system at
all. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
800 (1996) (emphasizing the distinction between the perpetrator and the state
criminal justice system and highlighting that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy

only addresses the perpetrator).
194. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 15, supra note 43, at 97 (statement of Burt
Neuborne) (claiming that the state action requirement only applies to Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment and not to Congress's power to enact appropriate legislation under Section Five).
195. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
196. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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Amendment rights." 7 However, neither of these cases stands for
that proposition.'
In the alternative, advocates of the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy claim that the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to create a new, substantive "right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender"' " and empowers Congress
to remedy the new right.2" This theory does not support the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy either because a "right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender"' does not further Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.'
1.

State Action Is Required

In Guest, the Court did state that conduct prohibited by Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment need not involve
"exclusive or direct" state action.2° Furthermore, while identifying
the statute at issue as remedial, the Guest court intimated that
Congress might reach private conduct with substantive legislation. 2 4 Nonetheless, the Court predicated its holding that the pri-

197. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 15, supra note 43, at 98 (statement of Burt
Neuborne) (assuring the Senate Judiciary Committee that "six members of
the Supreme Court have explicitly approved the use of Section [Five] of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to enact legislation outlawing private interference
with the enjoyment of equality values protected by Section [One]"). The six
Justices to which Professor Neuborne referred, however, sat on the bench in
1966. Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 746 (1966)).
198. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of Guest and Griffin. In fact, no
Supreme Court majority opinion has annulled the state action requirement
implicit in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 105, § 15.5.
199. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
200. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 15, supra note 43, at 99 (statement of Burt

Neuborne) (distinguishing cases in which the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot reach private action through the Fourteenth Amendment from
the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy because the provision remedies a right that it
creates).
201. VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
202. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 142, at 415-16 (suggesting that under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may legislate private conduct but recognizing that the clause contains limits on Congressional power
nonetheless).
203. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966). However, the Court
agreed that "rights under the Equal Protection Clause itself arise only where
there has been involvement of the State or of one acting under color of its
authority". Id.
204. Id. at 754-55. Commentators have disagreed as to the significance of
this statement. Compare, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 105, § 12.1
(explaining that although six justices in Guest insinuated in dictum that Congress may regulate non-state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court has not held so by a majority), with SCHWARTZ, supra note 142, at 41516 (claiming that Congress may proscribe any action, even if private, which it
finds interferes with a Fourteenth Amendment right where full protection of
the right necessitates such a proscription).
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vate conduct at issue might have violated the Equal Protection
Clause on allegations that police officials conspired with the defendants to falsify police reports.'
The Court ruled that such a
conspiracy would constitute a sufficient degree of state action.2
Thus, despite its dalliance regarding substantive equal protection
legislation, the Guest Court did not negate the state action requirement.m
In Griffin, the Court found that Congress intended to reach
purely private conspiracies under the statute at issue.2" Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute.2" Contrary to the assertions of
20
the Senate Judiciary Committee and those testifying before it,

1

however, the Griffin court did not rely on Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment power.2 ' Rather, it found authority in the Thirteenth
Amendment and in the right of interstate travel which it purposely
212
noted "does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment."
Moreover, it explicitly declined to consider the statute's constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 "' Subsequent cases
dealing with the same statute at issue in Griffin have unequivocally asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit
purely private acts of discrimination. 214 Thus, as the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy addresses purely private acts of discrimination, the
provision does not find authority in the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5
205. Guest, 383 U.S. at 756.
206. Id.
207. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 105, § 12.1.

208. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971).
209. Id. at 105.
210. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 15, supra note 43, at 98 (statement of Burt
Neuborne) (relating to the Senate Judiciary Committee that Griffin upheld
the statute at issue there under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
211. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107.
212. Id. at 104-06.
213. Id. at 107.
214. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384-85
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Though the majority opinion in Novotny
avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the statute at issue, Justice Stevens
wrote separately to clarify the holding in Griffin. Id. at 381. He explained
that "[s]ome privileges and immunities of citizenship, such as the right to engage in interstate travel and the right to be free of the badges of slavery, are
protected by the Constitution against interference by private action ..

.,"

Id.

at 383. Stevens also stated that "[oither privileges and immunities of citizenship such as the right to due process of law and the right to the equal protection of the laws are protected by the Constitution only against state action."
Id. at 384. Justice Stevens explicitly categorized discrimination against
women which violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a violation of the latter type of privilege and immunity. Id. Therefore, Justice Stevens unquestionably asserted, such a claim requires proof of
"unfair treatment by the [sitate, not by private parties." Id. (emphasis
added).
215. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
799 (1996).
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2. No FourteenthAmendment GuaranteeAgainst Private Violence
Undaunted by the weight of precedent, at least one constitutional expert advised the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy can avoid the state action requirement because it creates a substantive right to be free from acts of
gender-motivated violence rather than simply remedying rights
found elsewhere. 26 However, even those commentators most disposed to negating the state action requirement agree that any substantive rights that Congress creates under the Fourteenth
Amendment must be in furtherance of the guarantees expressed in
that provision. 27 The Senate Judiciary Committee professed that
the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy furthers a female victim's equal
protection rights.2 6
As the Brzonkala Court pointed out, though, the VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy does not further the guarantee that the state will
not deprive a victim of equal protection of the laws.2 9 First, the
gender-motivated act of violence does not itself deprive the victim
of her equal protection of the laws.' ° To the contrary, the act is illegal in most instances."l Second, the Brzonkala Court correctly
recognized that any crime committed by the perpetrator does not
force the criminal justice system to deny the female victim her
equal protection rights any more than the criminal justice system
forces the perpetrator to commit the crime.' To redress the crime,
therefore, does not redress the denial of equal protection.' They
constitute two distinct injuries.2M
Nevertheless, the provision addresses only the individual

216. Hearingson S. 15, supra note 43, at 99 (statement of Burt Neuborne).
217. SCHWARTZ, supra note 142, at 415-16. Schwartz maintains that Guest
overruled the state action requirement as applied to congressional legislation
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 415. Nevertheless,
Schwartz concedes that Congress' power under Section Five "is limited to the
types of cases specified." Id.
218. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (1993).
219. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801. In fact, the Brzonkala Court denied
that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy furthers due process rights or privileges
and immunities either. Id. The court stated emphatically that "[nlo reasonable possibility exists that [the] VAWA [Civil Rights Remedy] will remedy any
legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern." Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 797-98.
221. Id. at 797. "Even with the inadequate criminal remedy for gendermotivated crimes against women, the states do not permit individuals to
commit violent gender-motivated acts against women .... Such acts are unlawful both under state criminal and state tort laws" Id. (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 797-98. That a state might "pursue [its] criminal laws against
rape and domestic abuse less vigorously than other laws" does not put the
rapist or abuser and the state in concert. Id. at 797.
223. Id.
224. Id.

1997]

Violence Against Women Act

perpetrator and not the state criminal justice system."m Two reasons may explain the misdirection of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. First, Congress might have believed that if it could deter
rapists and abusers from committing their crimes by threat of federal civil liability, then the victim would not need to come before
the state criminal justice system; thus, the state criminal justice
system would not have the opportunity to deny her equal protection. To presume, however, that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
will deter all gender-motivated violence, where criminal sanctions
have not, is disingenuous."6 Some victims of gender-motivated
violence will inevitably still face state criminal justice systems,
and the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy has done nothing to ensure
that those victims will not face the gender bias so well documented
by the Senate and House committees. 22'
The second potential explanation for Congress addressing the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy to the perpetrator of gender-motivated
violence is because it does not require a lengthy chain of causation.
Congress just wanted to create another deterrence to rape and
domestic violence. The legislative history overwhelmingly supports this explanation.m Nonetheless, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not empower Congress to create a right against private acts of
violence, no matter how noble Congress' intentions.m
Thus, Congress has directed the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
2
toward the wrong party to further equal protection rights.
Moreover, because Congress directed the provision toward the private rapist or abuser rather than the state criminal justice systems, the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy. 1 The Fourteenth Amendment still rectifies
only state action violative of the Amendment's guarantees and any
substantive rights created by Congress in furtherance of those

225. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
226. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43 (1991) (proclaiming state criminal
and tort laws inadequate to eliminate gender-motivated violence).
227. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779, 800 (1996) (underscoring that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy does not
deter the state criminal justice systems from continuing to treat female victims of violence disparagingly nor does the provision hold the state criminal
justice system accountable for its discrimination).
228. See supra Part I for evidence that the committees and witnesses before
them wanted to cure the prevalent problem of violence against women first
and foremost and that each provision of the VAWA constituted a step toward
that ultimate goal.
229. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explicitly reiterating that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not authorize Congress to create rights against private individuals even where the right created addresses gender discrimination).
230. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp at 800.
23L Novotny, 442 U.S. at 384 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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guarantees must also rectify state action."' Despite the creation of
a substantive right, Congress did not have power to enact the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. KEEP THE BABY BUT THROW OUT THE BATH WATER
As neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the provision, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy is
unconstitutional. Arguably, Congress could amend the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy so that it passes constitutional muster.233
Congress could add a jurisdictional element as discussed in
Lopez.2" Such an element would save the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy under the Commerce Clause.25 However, if the provision
required proof of interstate activity, vast numbers of gendermotivated violence victims could not utilize the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy.2 0 Similarly, a remedy directed at the state criminal justice systems rather than the perpetrator would not further Congress' purpose to curb the rate of rape and domestic violence 7 because such a remedy does not deter the perpetrator. Therefore,
this Comment proposes that either Congress repeal the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy or the courts strike the provision as unconstitutional.
This proposal does not, however, encompass other provisions
of the VAWA. The VAWA consists of much more than the Civil
Rights Remedy. Through its spending powers and its vast resource of research capabilities, the federal government can still
prove invaluable to the war on violence against women. The
problems of gender-based violence and of discrimination in the
criminal justice systems still exist and still require federal efforts
to combat them.
Other VAWA remedies that confront the specific acts of violence include grants to the states available through the U.S. Attorney General.2
These grants accomplish two important goals.
First, they provide funding for training state law enforcement and
232. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 105, at § 15.5.

233. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801 (suggesting that Congress has
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a revised version of the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy).
234. See supra Part II for a discussion of Lopez.
235. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (holding legislation regulating non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause must
contain a jurisdictional element).
236. See Easterling, supra note 19, at 949 (averring that only a few incidents
of domestic violence involve crossing state lines).
237. See Hearingon Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Representative Charles Schumer) (underscoring Congress's intent "combat [these]
insidious crime[s]").
238. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3711-3797 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg (1994).
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prosecution personnel, for hiring more personnel, for creating or
enlarging victim outreach and advocacy programs, and for collecting data."s Second, they permit the U.S. Department of Justice to
collect data on the various state programs through a reciprocal reporting requirement which, in turn, can be used to advise other
states on effective plansuO Similar provisions provide funding to

non-profit rape prevention education and training programs" and
to community domestic violence programs.242
Furthermore, Subtitle D of the VAWA, the Equal Justice for
Women in the Courts Act, directly addresses the reported discrimination in the criminal justice systems.'
It provides funding
for training and educating state and federal judges. 2" In addition,
the provision authorizes judicial studies on gender-bias in the federal courts similar to those conducted by many states.2 5
The VAWA provisions that fund state criminal law and victim-assistance efforts, that authorize judicial investigations and
training, and that mandate national studies" draw upon the
strengths of a centralized government. These provisions recognize
that the federal government has advantages that the individual
state governments do not possess. The federal government, for instance, can analyze the problem of domestic violence on a broader
scale by collecting data from all of the states, rather than relying
on any one state's experience. Similarly, the federal government
need not divide its efforts between increasing awareness of violence against women on the one hand and enlarging the criminal
justice system to meet the demand generated by such awareness
on the other. 7 Most importantly, the provisions of the VAWA,
other than the Civil Rights Remedy, create the concerted, national

239. Id.
240. Id.

241. Public Health and Human Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300w-300w-10
(1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 300w-10 (1994).
242. Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10416
(1994), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 10416 (1994).
243. Equal Justice for Women in the Courts Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1370114002 (1994).
244. Id. §§ 13991, 14001. The fact that Congress recognized that genderbias may also exist in the federal criminal justice system arguably further repudiates its claim that the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy cures equal protection
violations by opening "the best court system in the world" to victims of gender-motivated violence. See supra note 108 for a discussion of the assertion
that the federal justice system is superior to the states' system.
245. Id. § 14001.
246. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14012 (ordering a study of campus rape); 42 U.S.C.
§ 14013 (requiring a report on battered women's syndrome).
247. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 39 (1990) (reporting the burdens placed on
the state criminal justice systems by increased volumes of domestic violence
and rape cases).
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effort that Senator Biden called form without ignoring the Constitution or the states' autonomy.
CONCLUSION
Congress correctly identified violence against women and the
subsequent bias that its victims experience in the criminal justice
system as a serious problem. Congress also correctly recognized
that the states cannot solve the problem alone. Nevertheless,
Congress does not have constitutional authority to implement
every idea it has.4 9 The Framers purposefully created a federal
government of delegated powers2'0 which must not eclipse the
states' sovereignty.29 '
Many of the VAWA provisions recognize that the system the
Framers created does not deter federal contribution to the war on
violence against women, but rather ensures that the states and
victims will not have to wage the war alone. The VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy, however, eliminates the states' participation. This
type of action that Constitution will not allow. Thus, although a
well-intentioned attempt to empower individual victims, the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy proves too constitutionally infirm to
survive meaningful scrutiny.

248. See id. at 28 (quoting Senator Biden's opening statement before the
Senate Judiciary Committee's first hearing on violence against women).
249. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801 (1996).
250. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
251. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).

